Observing that rates of polygynous marriage tend to increase with wealth difference, the authors of this paper attempt to understand why monogamous marriage has flourished in Europe and other parts of the world even as wealth differences have expanded. The authors theorize that monogamous marriage promotes the success of the groups that employ the practice by suppressing intra-group competition and that this is what has happened in Europe. Subsequently, the authors test hypotheses that are implicated in this theory.

Observing that rates of polygynous marriage tend to increase with wealth difference, the authors of this paper attempt to understand why monogamous marriage has flourished in Europe and other parts of the world even as wealth differences have expanded. The authors theorize that monogamous marriage promotes the success of the groups that employ the practice by suppressing intra-group competition and that this is what has happened in Europe. Subsequently, the authors test hypotheses that are implicated in this theory.

In this article, the authors reconsider the polygyny threshold model in order to account for the "polygyny paradox." This paradox, as the authors define it, is the trend away from polygyny as societies adopt stratified agricultural economies. This is despite an increase in both the importance of material wealth and greater leaves of wealth inequality both of which would otherwise suggest increased polygyny. The authors develop a new model that does account for this paradox.

This article draws from anthropology, psychology, and history to gain insight into the causes of large-scale psychological variation among humans. The authors of this study are mainly concerned with the way that weak kinship structures induced by policies of the Western Church in Europe may have resulted in the modern "WEIRD" (an acronym for "Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic") psychological profiles in that same region. By correlating the amount of contact with the Western Church, rates of cross-cousin marriage (as an element of kin tightness), and degrees of individualism (as an element of WEIRD psychology), the authors are able to find support for this theory.

This article draws from anthropology, psychology, and history to gain insight into the causes of large-scale psychological variation among humans. The authors of this study are mainly concerned with the way that weak kinship structures induced by policies of the Western Church in Europe may have resulted in the modern "WEIRD" (an acronym for "Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic") psychological profiles in that same region. By correlating the amount of contact with the Western Church, rates of cross-cousin marriage (as an element of kin tightness), and degrees of individualism (as an element of WEIRD psychology), the authors are able to find support for this theory.

In this article, the authors reconsider the polygyny threshold model in order to account for the "polygyny paradox." This paradox, as the authors define it, is the trend away from polygyny as societies adopt stratified agricultural economies. This is despite an increase in both the importance of material wealth and greater leaves of wealth inequality both of which would otherwise suggest increased polygyny. The authors develop a new model that does account for this paradox.

This article draws from anthropology, psychology, and history to gain insight into the causes of large-scale psychological variation among humans. The authors of this study are mainly concerned with the way that weak kinship structures induced by policies of the Western Church in Europe may have resulted in the modern "WEIRD" (an acronym for "Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic") psychological profiles in that same region. By correlating the amount of contact with the Western Church, rates of cross-cousin marriage (as an element of kin tightness), and degrees of individualism (as an element of WEIRD psychology), the authors are able to find support for this theory.

This study utilizes Bayesian statistics to test the associations between harsh environments (specifically those with higher degrees of climate variability and relatively lower average temperature and precipitation) and alloparental care in societies throughout the world. Results support the hypothesis that societies in harsher environments show higher rates of alloparental care and that societies with higher rates of starvation and resource stress exhibit lower rates of alloparental care. The authors explain this theorizing that in the former relative costs are sufficiently outweighed by the benefits of this type of cooperation and in the latter they are not. They conclude that their results support the plasticity of human alloparenting as a response to varying ecology.

This study investigates the relationship between domestic organization (i.e. family structure and size) and democracy at both the communal and supracommunal levels. The authors suggest that the prevalence of independent monogamous families in Europe in the Late Middle Ages may have facilitated the political evolution toward democracy.

In this article, the authors reconsider the polygyny threshold model in order to account for the "polygyny paradox." This paradox, as the authors define it, is the trend away from polygyny as societies adopt stratified agricultural economies. This is despite an increase in both the importance of material wealth and greater leaves of wealth inequality both of which would otherwise suggest increased polygyny. The authors develop a new model that does account for this paradox.