Observing that rates of polygynous marriage tend to increase with wealth difference, the authors of this paper attempt to understand why monogamous marriage has flourished in Europe and other parts of the world even as wealth differences have expanded. The authors theorize that monogamous marriage promotes the success of the groups that employ the practice by suppressing intra-group competition and that this is what has happened in Europe. Subsequently, the authors test hypotheses that are implicated in this theory.

Observing that rates of polygynous marriage tend to increase with wealth difference, the authors of this paper attempt to understand why monogamous marriage has flourished in Europe and other parts of the world even as wealth differences have expanded. The authors theorize that monogamous marriage promotes the success of the groups that employ the practice by suppressing intra-group competition and that this is what has happened in Europe. Subsequently, the authors test hypotheses that are implicated in this theory.

In this article, the authors reconsider the polygyny threshold model in order to account for the "polygyny paradox." This paradox, as the authors define it, is the trend away from polygyny as societies adopt stratified agricultural economies. This is despite an increase in both the importance of material wealth and greater leaves of wealth inequality both of which would otherwise suggest increased polygyny. The authors develop a new model that does account for this paradox.

This article draws from anthropology, psychology, and history to gain insight into the causes of large-scale psychological variation among humans. The authors of this study are mainly concerned with the way that weak kinship structures induced by policies of the Western Church in Europe may have resulted in the modern "WEIRD" (an acronym for "Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic") psychological profiles in that same region. By correlating the amount of contact with the Western Church, rates of cross-cousin marriage (as an element of kin tightness), and degrees of individualism (as an element of WEIRD psychology), the authors are able to find support for this theory.

This article draws from anthropology, psychology, and history to gain insight into the causes of large-scale psychological variation among humans. The authors of this study are mainly concerned with the way that weak kinship structures induced by policies of the Western Church in Europe may have resulted in the modern "WEIRD" (an acronym for "Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic") psychological profiles in that same region. By correlating the amount of contact with the Western Church, rates of cross-cousin marriage (as an element of kin tightness), and degrees of individualism (as an element of WEIRD psychology), the authors are able to find support for this theory.

In this article, the authors reconsider the polygyny threshold model in order to account for the "polygyny paradox." This paradox, as the authors define it, is the trend away from polygyny as societies adopt stratified agricultural economies. This is despite an increase in both the importance of material wealth and greater leaves of wealth inequality both of which would otherwise suggest increased polygyny. The authors develop a new model that does account for this paradox.

This study investigates the relationship between domestic organization (i.e. family structure and size) and democracy at both the communal and supracommunal levels. The authors suggest that the prevalence of independent monogamous families in Europe in the Late Middle Ages may have facilitated the political evolution toward democracy.

In this article, the authors reconsider the polygyny threshold model in order to account for the "polygyny paradox." This paradox, as the authors define it, is the trend away from polygyny as societies adopt stratified agricultural economies. This is despite an increase in both the importance of material wealth and greater leaves of wealth inequality both of which would otherwise suggest increased polygyny. The authors develop a new model that does account for this paradox.

This article draws from anthropology, psychology, and history to gain insight into the causes of large-scale psychological variation among humans. The authors of this study are mainly concerned with the way that weak kinship structures induced by policies of the Western Church in Europe may have resulted in the modern "WEIRD" (an acronym for "Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic") psychological profiles in that same region. By correlating the amount of contact with the Western Church, rates of cross-cousin marriage (as an element of kin tightness), and degrees of individualism (as an element of WEIRD psychology), the authors are able to find support for this theory.

This study uses a multiple regression analysis to examine the relationship between society type and several variables of societal organization. Results suggest that limited family type is more likely to be found in complex societies.