Through review of the economic literature and cross-cultural analysis of families (nuclear, stem, and complex), the authors show that family type is heterogeneous and argue that types other than nuclear have been largely ignored by economists. They encourage, based on their findings, further research on family structure and the development of better models for household decision making. They use ancestral populations in the ethnographic record to estimate country-level family patterns.

Through review of the economic literature and cross-cultural analysis of families (nuclear, stem, and complex), the authors show that family type is heterogeneous and argue that types other than nuclear have been largely ignored by economists. They encourage, based on their findings, further research on family structure and the development of better models for household decision making. They use ancestral populations in the ethnographic record to estimate country-level family patterns.

Through review of the economic literature and cross-cultural analysis of families (nuclear, stem, and complex), the authors show that family type is heterogeneous and argue that types other than nuclear have been largely ignored by economists. They encourage, based on their findings, further research on family structure and the development of better models for household decision making. They use ancestral populations in the ethnographic record to estimate country-level family patterns.

Through review of the economic literature and cross-cultural analysis of families (nuclear, stem, and complex), the authors show that family type is heterogeneous and argue that types other than nuclear have been largely ignored by economists. They encourage, based on their findings, further research on family structure and the development of better models for household decision making. They use ancestral populations in the ethnographic record to estimate country-level family patterns.

Through review of the economic literature and cross-cultural analysis of families (nuclear, stem, and complex), the authors show that family type is heterogeneous and argue that types other than nuclear have been largely ignored by economists. They encourage, based on their findings, further research on family structure and the development of better models for household decision making. They use ancestral populations in the ethnographic record to estimate country-level family patterns.

This study discusses childcare done by children. While no empirical hypotheses are tested, the authors identify some potential sociocultural and developmental correlates of childcare by children and provide relevant descriptive statistics. Possible correlates include mother-child relationships, conceptions and emergence of childhood stages, organization of play groups, development of social responsibility, sex differences, personality development, cognitive style and cognitive development, motivation and learning.

This paper describes a typology which is intended to indicate the kinds of family and kinship structures associated with the conflicting requirements of cohesion and differentiation of broader social structures.

The author examines modes of marriage and societal organization from a functionalist (general evolutionary) perspective. He focuses on the relationships of subsistence (economic) patterns, settlement patterns, and social complexity to predicting modes of marriage, with particular emphasis on the importance of subsistence as an underlying structural influence upon social patterns.

The author examines modes of marriage and societal organization from a functionalist (general evolutionary) perspective. He focuses on the relationships of subsistence (economic) patterns, settlement patterns, and social complexity to predicting modes of marriage, with particular emphasis on the importance of subsistence as an underlying structural influence upon social patterns.

This study examines the predictors of arranged marriage versus marriage for love. Several predictions are supported and results uphold the hypothesis that "societies promote the method of marriage contract enforcement best adapted to available production technology, incentives to misbehave, and methods of coercion."